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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 162 
Accident time: 12:30 Accident Date: 29/09/1998 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 14/10/1998 
ID original source: TA/PS/PT Name of source: CMAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast Ground condition: electromagnetic 
wet 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group operated in a two-man drill whereby one 
deminer used the detector and marked any signals while the other looked for tripwires, cut 
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undergrowth and excavated any detector readings. A third team member may have been 
resting [group representatives appeared confused about team size when asked in January 
1999]. The demining group issued full body protection and their drills assumed the deminer 
would lie prone while excavating. 
The demining group conducted an internal investigation led by an expatriate Technical 
Advisor on the day following the accident. A copy of the report was found at the country MAC. 
The following summarises its content.  
The ground conditions were very soft and muddy (due to recent rainfall) and there was a high 
level of "natural soil contamination" [presumably laterite] at the accident site. The victim and 
his partner were part of a 12 man team. They clearing a 2m wide safety lane to gain access to 
a remote part of the mined area. The victim cleared the undergrowth from an area and his 
partner swept it with a detector, (the Schiebel AN/19) but it "signal every where". The victim 
was prodding over the entire area when the accident occurred.  
The victim was working in an "unauthorised semi-prone" position. (He claimed to have been 
lying on a "blue sheet" provided to keep deminers from getting too wet or muddy but there 
was some doubt over this). A photograph illustrated the victim's supposed position – showing 
a deminer lying on his side with his torso raised as he leaned on one elbow.  
He initiated a mine with his prodder at 12:30 and walked away from the blast area unaided. 
After first aid, he left the site by ambulance at 12:46. 
He had been wearing a "ballistic jacket", a helmet and a visor. His prodder (with a flat blade 
like a knife) was found to have lost 1cm at the tip and was slightly bent. Visor, helmet and 
"vest" were splashed with mud. An inspection of the "vest" showed a "4cm long nick in the 
collar". The investigators speculated whether this was caused by the tip of the prodder. The 
visor was found to have been spattered with mud both inside and outside, and the victim 
stated that the helmet strap was loose so the visor had been "a little bit up" at the time of the 
accident [explaining how his face and eyes were injured]. 
When the crater was examined the investigators found a tangle of roots ranging from 1 to 
4cm thick around the sides of the crater, and also "parts of a T-72 model unknown". They also 
noted that there was "a high water table in the lane and the area surrounding the crater". 
The victim stated that he was prodding to a depth of about 8cm and did not feel the mine 
before it exploded. He said that normally when the ground was very wet they stopped 
operations because it was not comfortable to lie down. He maintained that he had been lying 
on his plastic sheet but was still getting wet and the ground conditions were not safe to work 
in. 
The Supervisor felt that the victim had been following SOPs and speculated that the mine 
may have been on its side. 
The Sub-Supervisor stated that "the victim had worn the safety equipment properly" and that 
the prodder was still in the victim's hand when he was found. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the network of roots that had grown around the mine had 
applied pressure to the mine and was a contributory factor. The deminer "complicated this 
situation by choosing to feel his way through with the tip of the prodder instead of excavating 
and visually inspecting the object in question". 
The Supervisor had failed to realise that the ground conditions were too wet to conduct 
demining operations at the accident site. He should have moved his men to a drier area. He 
had been warned  before about his inability to keep up with the location and progression of 
his teams in the field. 
"The unorthodox prodding position used by [the victim] was a direct result of the poor working 
conditions he was placed in. Although it is not a direct contribution to the accident, it is clear 
that by using a semi-prone position it must have been difficult to properly investigate detector 
readings." [Note that the victim was not investigating detector readings if his detector 
signalled everywhere.]   
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The picture above (top) was included by the investigators to explain the victim's position. The 
picture beneath it was taken by the researcher in 1999 - a position observed being used by 
the group whenever press and observers are present. [Having tried it, it is not possible to lie 
flatter than this and still have a good view of what you are excavating.] 
 
Recommendations 
The internal investigators recommended that the Supervisor should be permanently relieved 
of his position [he was] and that the minefield manager should be given a written warning. 
Also that a small garden tool should be issued to aid excavation, and that all deminers should 
be made aware of their right to refuse to work in conditions that conflicted with SOPs. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 207 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: none Time to hospital: 56 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet 
 











A medical report dated 1st October 1998 was made available. It stated that the victim arrived 
at the Emergency Hospital, Battambang at 13:26. His  injuries were described as: 
"bilateral conjunctival foreign bodies (mud, dust, sand), bilateral superficial corneal 
and conjunctival lesions, blood collection in the anterior chamber of right eye 
(probably due to penetrating injury), resulting in reduced vision on right eye: 




The primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as "Field control inadequacy" 
because according to the investigators the field management failed to take ground conditions 
into account when deciding that it was safe to work. 
The victim's prodder may have been made using an unsuitably brittle grade of steel. The 
photograph was unclear, but the end of the prodder appeared to have broken away and may 
have been the cause of the cut in the cover of the frag-jacket. It seems that the fragment 
would not have hit the deminer as it passed over his shoulder if the collar of the vest had not 
been there.  
The inclusion of a photograph of the accident-area being checked by an investigator wearing 
no protective equipment (see “Related papers”) may be indicative of how the group operated 
when not observed. The person who included it in a report was certainly forgetting the group's 
public position over wearing protection.   
 
Related papers 
The file included photographs of the site and of the damaged prodder and "vest".  
A site sketch showed that the victim was about as far distant from the Supervisor as was 
possible at the time of the accident. The "sub-supervisor" was close at hand. 
A photograph in the report was headed "Area Verification" and showed the accident area 
being checked with a detector. The investigator carrying out the area-check was not wearing 
the demining group's protective vest, helmet or visor.  
The demining group's country manager was interviewed in Phnom Penh on 4th March 1999. 
He said that the victim returned to work as a deminer during December 1998. His medical 
costs and salary during recovery had been paid but no compensation was given.  
The expatriate Technical Advisor who had investigated the accident said that the fragment 
that had hit the collar had not damaged the Kevlar inside and had probably struck a 
grazing/glancing blow.  
When asked about the demining group's continued use of the Schiebel, the country director 
said they had tried the MineLab but that their deminers found its background noise "like a 
swarm of mosquitoes" very irritating.  
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